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Abstract—Some ballots such as those for local elections
in Germany contain more than 500 candidates, allow for
more than 70 votes and the system allows voters to perform
cumulative voting, vote splitting and crossing out of candidates
which results in huge ballot papers containing only one race.
As none of the existing electronic voting systems seem to be
feasible for this kind of election we propose a new approach
in this paper. The main idea is to have a vote casting device
that does not store votes but only prints a summary of the
selection voters made at device. This printout is put into the
ballot box. In addition, to the human readable summary, the so
called Voter Verifiable Summary of the Vote Paper Audit Trail
(VV-SV-PAT) contains a 2D barcode which makes it easier to
properly enter votes into the counting software. In addition,
we propose an improvement for the counting software. With
this approach we aim to support the actual procedure of vote
casting and tallying by an accurate use of technology while at
the same time preserving, or even improving, verifiability and
usability compared to the traditional system.
Keywords-electronic voting, paper audit trail, verifiability
I. INTRODUCTION
Elections vary greatly from country to country, but also
within each country for different types of elections. Some
have very simple ballots with two candidates or just a yes
or no question, while other ballots like for local elections
in Germany contain more than 500 candidates, allow for
more than 70 votes and the system also allows voters to
perform cumulative voting, vote splitting and crossing out of
candidates which results in huge ballot papers (in Darmstadt
in 2006 local elections about 27” x 35”). Manually tallying
is very likely to be error prone and time intensive. The
tallying for the local elections in Germany usually takes
between four to six days. They have computer support for
the counting and tallying where they enter vote by vote.
Also vote casting is error prone as voters might accidently
and without realizing spoil the vote. Consequently, electronic
support could dramatically improve the situation for both
voters and poll workers.
There exist many different types of electronic voting
schemes and electronic voting systems in use. Some are
for use in polling stations and still paper-based, such as
punch card and optical scan systems. Other systems use
voting machines such as mechanical lever machines or
direct recording electronic voting machines (DREs) in the
polling booth. Furthermore, there is the development of
remote electronic voting protocols and systems. However,
in a previous report [1], we show that neither one of the
proposed voting protocols or schemes nor those electronic
voting systems in use seems to be feasible for this kind of
election, with highly complex and large ballot papers that
have just one race on it.
The goal of this paper is to propose a concept for an
electronic voting system that is feasible for elections with
such large and complicated ballot papers. The main idea is
to use vote casting devices instead of DREs which do not
store votes but just print special voter verifiable paper audit
trails (VVPATs), namely so called Voter Verifiable Summary
of the Vote Paper Audit Trails (VV-SV-PATs) on a simple
DIN-A4/letter format piece of paper. The summary of the
vote contains the interpretation of the selections made on the
vote casting device. Thus, it supports both the vote casting
and the counting process. This approach is further improved
by printing a 2D barcode on the VV-SV-PAT in order to
simplify the counting process and by using a second monitor
for the counting process in order to increase the transparency
of the counting procedure.
We do not claim to provide an approach that is perfectly
secure. While our approach provides a much higher level of
verifiability and accuracy than the traditional paper based
elections, both for vote casting and tallying, it does not
yet fully solve the secrecy challenge that DREs have in
common. A malicious DRE could track the order and time
of cast votes while this information is later combined with
the information of which voter casts his vote at which time.
However, we believe that it is possible to find an adequate
solution. In addition, the proposed scheme is not based on
heavy cryptography which makes it easier for the public to
understand and thus to trust this particular type of electronic
voting system.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We first explain
in Section II the local election in Hesse, Germany, and show
its scale based on data from the 2006 election. We then show
in the related work section (Section III) that existing voting
schemes and systems are not applicable for elections like the
local ones in Hesse. Section IV sketches the interface of the
vote casting device. Afterwards, in Section V, we propose
our own approach to adopt the vote casting device with a
Voter Verifiable Summary of the Vote on a Paper Audit Trail
including a 2D barcode and how to use it to improve the
tallying procedure. In Section VI we conduct a brief security
and usability analysis of the proposed approach and compare
it with the traditional paper based voting system. Finally, in
Section VII, we conclude with suggestions for future work
to further improve the proposed voting system.
II. LOCAL ELECTIONS IN HESSE
The local election in Darmstadt, Hesse, combines the
elections for the administrative body of towns, municipal and
districts and is held for all citizens of one district at the same
time. The ballot paper consists of several parties, identifiable
by their name, abbreviation and number. Each party consists
of several candidates, listed by their full name, an individual
number (unique for a particular election), and the district he
is living in. The candidates’ names are ranked in a particular
order specified by their party. The number of available
seats determines the maximum number of candidates each
party can nominate. Next to each party, there is one ballot
checkbox to record the voter’s preference while next to each
candidate, there are three checkboxes (compare to Figure 1).
Figure 1. Ballot paper used in German local election
Before the polling station opens for vote casting, the ballot
box is opened and the election authority and every voter can
check that it is empty. Afterwards, the box is locked and is
not permitted to be opened before the polling station closes.
Voters can select at most as many candidates as the
number of available seats. Vote splitting, cumulative voting
and crossing out of candidates is allowed. Correspondingly,
voters have the following options to cast a valid vote:
1) They select n candidates while n ≤ number of seats.
The voters can split their vote by casting votes for
candidates of several parties on one ballot sheet.
Cumulative voting is provided such that a voter can
cast up to three votes for one candidate.
2) They select one party and may or may not cross out
single candidates. In this case, the votes are distributed
to candidates of this party during the counting process
according to predefined rules while the order of the
candidates on the ballot paper is very important. In
this sequence, skipping those that are crossed out, the
candidates each get a vote until the maximum number
of votes is used or every candidate has three votes.
3) They select n candidates and party X while n <
number of seats and the selected candidates do not
belong to party X . In this case, all remaining votes
(the maximum number of votes minus number of votes
cast for several candidates) will be distributed to all
candidates of the party.1
Spoilt votes include breaking one of the three rules above as
well as those with additional marks, writings, or paintings
on it as well as empty ballots. The ballots are folded in the
polling booth before being put into the ballot box outside
the polling booth.
The tallying takes place partially in the polling station
and partially at central venues which are open to the public,
with every citizen having the right to observe the process.
In the polling station, the poll workers only manually tally
ballot papers where the voter cast his vote for only one
party. All remaining ballot papers are taken to the state
office and apportioned to several groups of three people
who count these ballot papers using software. During this
process one poll worker reads the markings aloud while
another enters them in the software. This can be done by
entering the position of the marked candidate or party or
click on the associated entry on the displayed ballot. A third
poll worker observes and controls the whole process. Every
ballot paper is marked with the number of the associated
digital ballot which offers the possibility to audit the correct
transfer afterwards. Finally the election result of the digital
ballot papers is counted automatically by the system. Both
this result as well as the manually counted one is entered in
a second software to tally the election outcome. The voting
system is a party proportional one.
These decentralized results are reported to a central
authority responsible for the whole state. Although the
counting and tallying is (partially) computer supported, the
definitive result is usually not known until after four days. To
get an overview and a better understanding of the election,
Table I provides some numbers from the local election of
the city of Darmstadt in 2006.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section we summarize the results of [1] showing
that existing approaches seem not to be feasible for this
type of election. Note, already in [1] we concentrate on
electronic voting systems implemented for polling stations as
these systems do not force a radical departure from the vote
1If n = number of votes then the selection of party X will be ignored.
If votes are assigned to candidates of party X then at least these votes are
assigned to the selected candidates of party X .
Table I
LOCAL ELECTION OF DARMSTADT, HESSE, IN 2006 [2]
Number of cast votes 2,898,159
Number of invalid votes 1,383
Number of voters cast a vote 44,385
Number of eligible voters 101,666
Size of the ballot paper 90 cm x 70 cm / 35" x 271/2"
Number of candidates 502 in 13 lists
Number of votes to cast 71
casting process that the voter is used to, and do not go along
with new challenges of casting votes in private environments
instead of in protected ones in the polling stations.
All systems which, in the current version, only offer
homomorphic tallying, such as ThreeBallot [3], Scratch and
Vote [4] and Bingo Voting [5] cannot be used because the
context of the whole ballot paper has to be evaluated in
the counting process to interpret each vote properly. The
use of electronic voting systems like Preˆt a` Voter [6] and
Scantegrity II [7], which offer the voter the possibility
to verify the digital ballot by cryptographic means, have
disadvantages regarding their usability. To print the candi-
date list with 500 candidates in arbitrary order, which is
necessary for Preˆt a` Voter, and ask the voters to find their
71 candidates in this list makes it impossible to use such
a system. Also Scantegrity II which offers the voter the
possibility to note down confirmation codes for all marked
candidates and parties is impractical for an election with 71
votes per voter. Scanning solutions are not feasible as it is
very difficult to scan these huge paper ballots properly and
the required scanner is very expensive while it can only be
used for anything else than elections. Another solution is
the Digital Voting Pen / DotVote system [8] which provides
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails by design. Besides a
couple of smaller problems, the Digital Voting Pen is not
feasible for the elections for the same reason as DREs with
VVPATs namely because of the low level of verifiability and
transparency (see also Subsection V-A for a more detailed
explanation).
IV. INTERFACE FOR VOTE CASTING
Proposing electronic vote casting for such huge ballot
papers results in interface challenges. There are two pos-
sibilities to ’get’ the ballot on the screen by using either a
very large screen that is able to show the whole ballot at once
in the same format (as it was implemented when using the
Nedap DREs) or an average monitor from office equipment
(let’s say 19”). While the first proposal requires dedicated
and very expensive monitors, the second one may allow the
usage of office monitors and even when buying new ones,
these will be cheaper than the huge ones. In addition, the
smaller ones are more flexible as the ballot might be larger
or smaller for future elections if more parties apply or more
parties propose the maximum number of candidates allowed
to propose. Therefore, our proposal is to be based on an
average office monitor of the size of 19”2.
The interface has to be designed in a way that allows
voters to make their selections as easy as in the traditional
system. Computers other than papers provide additional
possibilities to support voters which we propose to use:
providing the interpretation of the ballot, changing font
size, informing about invalid votes, audio support for blind
people, undo and search functions. We currently distinguish
between the following different interfaces and the corre-
sponding process diagram is illustrated in Figure 2:
• a welcome page with some instructions similar to the
one on the ballot paper.
• the main page where voters get the following informa-
tion and possibilities to continue:
– information that x out of y votes have been as-
signed and using which method(s). ”x out of y
votes” will be replace by ”spoiled” with a corre-
sponding explanation why it is spoilt;
– names and shortcuts of all parties;
– option to either select the party or candidates;
– option to spoil the vote (invalid or empty ballot);
– option to review the ballot;
– option to search for canidates;
– link to further information and help.
• the party list page where voters can assign votes to
candidates or cross candidates out and where they
can also select the party. It is possible to save this
assignment or to reset it.
• the search page where voters can search for candidate’s
name, number, party, and district while party and dis-
tricts are pull down menus. The search result is a list of
candidates (including name, number, party, and district)
that matches together with three checkboxes. There is
also a button ”cross out” assigned to each candidates.
The voter can either save his selection or rest and go
back to the main page. On this page the information ”
x out of y votes” is also displayed.
• the preview page that displays the summary of the
voter’s selection. This can either be accepted or modi-
fied by the voter.
• the confirmation page which displays again the sum-
mary of the vote and asks the voter to confirm. After
the confirmation, the device is disabled and needs to be
enabled by the poll workers before the next voter can
start the vote casting process.
This is work in progress as the interfaces currently only
exist on paper and are undertaking small usability tests to
further improve it. While we focus on these huge ballot
papers, we also have other types of elections in mind. For
instance in Germany, the same device should also be feasable
2We also propose to turn the screen by 90 degree in order to get a similar
shape to the printed paper audit trail.
Figure 2. Process diagram
for other types of elections including the federal election
with two races, one vote per race and usually less than
twenty options per race.
V. PROPOSED ELECTRONIC VOTING SOLUTION
While the last section addresses the interface design to
maximize the user support and in particular to decrease the
likelihood that voters spoil a vote accidently and without
realizing it, we propose in this section several extensions to
the vote casting and tallying process to increase the level
of verifiability while decreasing the vulnerability against
privacy threats compared to common DREs.
A. Vote Casting Device instead of DRE
The general idea of a DRE would be that it stores the votes
(hopefully in a random manner without timestamps) and at
the end of the Election Day, the DRE tallies the votes and
outputs the result. As this demands not only full trust in the
device regarding the secrecy of the vote but also regarding
the integrity of the election outcome, more and more DREs
are equipped with so called Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trails (VVPATs). The idea is that the DRE prints out the
vote for the voter, the voter can check whether this contains
his vote. Then, he confirms the vote at the DRE and puts
the paper vote in the ballot box. Now, the DRE still outputs
the result while in case of serious complaints it is possible
to manually tally the votes. Even if this approach is used in
some districts in the U.S. it decreases the level of verifiability
compared to the traditional paper based system and would
probably not comply with the public nature of elections
required in the German constitutional court decision [9].
Therefore, at least for German elections, is seems to be
plausible to require the tallying of all paper ballots before
announcing the final and legal binding election result.
Therefore, we propose a device that does not outputs the
result, and, correspondingly, does not store votes while it is
only used to cast and print a vote. Therefore, we call the
device not DRE any longer but vote casting device (VCD).
This approach also increases the level of privacy as it is
easier to ensure that the device does not record the order or
time of cast votes.
In our approach, it is possible that the voter prints more
than one paper ballot before he finally confirms. By doing
so, even a manipulated device cannot break the secrecy of
the vote as it does not know which one is put into the ballot
box. This will probably be restricted to a number of print
outs and then temporarily disabled. The VCD needs to be
reenabled for a voter who printed more than the allowed
number of votes before the voter can continue (enabling like
it is required for every new voter). It might also be necessary
to announce to the poll workers how many votes have been
printed to make sure that the remaining ones (those that
have not been put in the ballot box) are destroyed in order
to ensure that a voter does not put two or more ballot papers
in the ballot box. Note, the detailed process description is
left for future work and it needs to be carefully designed to
avoid accidental mistakes and to make it easy for voters and
poll workers to properly follow the process.
B. VV-SV-PAT - Simple Version
A vote casting device will hardly be feasible to printout
a VVPAT in the size of the original ballot as this would be
too expensive and impractical. Reducing fonts to print it on
an average Din-A4/letter size paper would not be readable
anymore. Therefore, our proposal is to only print out the
summary or the interpretation of the vote which we call
Voter Verifiable Summary of the Vote Paper Audit Trail (VV-
SV-PAT). The summary or interpretation must be represented
in a way that from the printing sound it cannot be deduced
whether someone spoiled a vote because this is just one
line or seventy single candidates. Currently, we define a
corresponding summary for all possible combinations of
vote assignments in a way that no information about the
content of the vote will be leaked by printing it. Note,
the printed ballot paper is not individualized but looks the
same when different voters make the same selections. The
summary will also be displayed to the voter on the screen
before he confirms and the corresponding paper trail will be
printed. In addition, the challenge is to design the summary
in a way that it is understandable for the voter.
Tallying the VV-SV-PAT is more efficient and less error
prone than the tallying of the huge ballots in the traditional
system. First of all, the ballot does not need to be unfolded
several times but only once. Further, the whole huge ballot
does not need to be examined for marks or figures while only
the information shown on the DIN-A4/letter paper needs to
be entered to the software. This VV-SV-PAT makes it also
easy and more efficient to check whether a particular vote
has properly been entered into the software.
C. VV-SV-PAT with 2D Barcode
Although in the improved version with VV-SV-PAT the
tallying process becomes easier, faster, and less error prone
we can do better. In order to further improve the tallying
processes, we propose to print 2D barcodes on the VV-
SV-PAT in addition to the human readable summary of the
vote (compare to Figure 3). These barcodes cover exactly
the same information as displayed to the voter on the
confirmation page and printed on the ballot paper above to
the barcode. Correspondingly, the barcodes are not unique
per ballot but are equal if the summary information is equal.
Figure 3. Examples of VV-SV-PATs with barcode
The voter only verifies the summary while he cannot
verify the barcode without additional equipment. This might
be acceptable as the barcode will be checked during the
tallying process and as smart phones are nowadays able to
interpret 2D barcodes.
In order to tally the votes, the poll workers scan the
barcode, compare the summary displayed on the screen with
the summary on the paper, confirm it and proceed. In order
to compare this very efficiently, the paper summary has the
following order: first the checkboxes, then the number of
candidate, and afterwards the name of the candidate while
the one displayed shows first the number of candidate and
then the checkboxes. The poll workers can now easily put
the paper next to the screen and compare as it is enough to
compare the checkboxes and the numbers.
D. Improving Universal Verifiability
So far, we have improved the traditional system regarding
many different properties. However, at the very end of the
tallying process, there is still a black box outputting the
final result based on the entered votes. To improve this
situation we recommend using two monitors for the tallying
process: One displaying the scanned summary and the other
one the intermediate result (that is after entering the second
vote already the sum of these two is displayed3). Thus, the
poll worker or even any observer can check that the proper
candidates got one more vote. In order to show the whole
ballot on this one screen we propose to display only the
candidate numbers and not the whole information provided
on the ballot paper.
E. Handling Complaints in Polling Stations
Finally we want to address complaints in the polling
station. The common problem of paper audit trails is that
it is hard to distinguish complaints by trustworthy voters
and an untrustworthy vote casting device from untrustworthy
voters and a trustworthy device when someone leaves the
polling booth telling the poll workers that the printout does
not match to the screen. The problem is that by proving
the difference the secrecy of the vote would be violated. In
addition, as the voter can print multiple times, he may have
changed the vote. The poll worker would see a screen that
would not match to the printout even if the device is honest.
As the vote casting device is only used to cast and
print, the voter could go to the device together with a
poll worker and challenge the device by making selections,
printout the ballot and compare it. This process should be
as realistic as when someone would really cast a vote. If
no difference between screen and paper audit trail occurs,
the probability of using a manipulated device is very low.
Thereby, it is possible to distinguish these two cases with a
high probability.
VI. ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze our proposal of using a vote
casting device with VV-SV-PATs including the barcodes
regarding verifiability, the secrecy of the vote, and usability
issues. This is mainly done in terms of a comparison with the
traditional paper based voting system with (partial) computer
supported counting and tallying as described in Section II.
We concentrate on verifiability, secrecy, and usability.
A. Verifiability
Verifiability can be split into three aspects: It should be
possible to verify that the vote is cast as intended, recorded
as cast and tallied as recorded.
In the traditional system cast as intended is somehow not
necessary to be verified as the vote is cast on paper. With our
proposed approach, it is also possible for the voter to verify
that the vote is cast as intended by verifying the printed
summary.
3Note, these intermediate results are computing during the tallying phase
and do therefore not violate any legal regulations.
The step recorded as cast can neither in the traditional
nor in our proposed system be verified by voters for their
own vote. It is only possible to verify this for all cast votes.
With both systems, voters or the public need to observe the
ballot box and ensure that no one opens it to take out ballots
or to modify them. In our proposal, it needs in addition to be
observed that barcodes are scanned and interpreted properly
during the counting phase. Similarly, in the traditional sys-
tem it needs to be observed that votes are properly entered
into the counting and tallying software. This observation
is possible in both cases as the corresponding places are
accessible for voters and the public. However, checking this
process in the tallying phase is easier than with the proposed
system than with the traditional one.
The traditional system does rarely provide a possibility
to verify that all votes are tallied as recorded. After hav-
ing entered all votes in the counting software and having
confirmed that all votes have been properly entered, the
software computes the result which is displayed a couple
of seconds later. In the proposed approach, the counting
software displays intermediate results after each entered
vote.
In addition, the time required to tally is shorter with our
approach than with the traditional one which increases the
probability that a voter or the public are able to observe the
whole process due to their time constraints. All this might
not provide the maximum level of verifiability but at least
a higher one than the traditional system does provide. The
level of universal verifiability could be further increased for
our proposed electronic voting system by using independent
software to count the stored barcodes or by publishing them
and thus enabling everyone to tally the result. Note, here, it
needs to be trusted that this list of barcodes corresponds to
the one scanned.
Verifiability of eligibility (only authorized votes are tal-
lied) is also ensured in both approaches to the same extent.
The voter or the public need to observe the ballot box in the
polling station and ensure that no unauthorized votes are put
into the ballot box.
B. Secrecy of the Vote
Our definition of the secrecy of the vote covers the aspect
that it is not possible to link the voter to his vote as well as
that voters cannot create any physical proof of the content
of their cast vote (receipt-freeness).
In the traditional system the secrecy of the vote is ensured
by the polling booth and the fact that the ballot paper is
folded before cast into the ballot box. In our approach, one
might argue that the vote casting device logs which vote
was ”cast” at what time. If someone has access to this data
and in addition would know who was in the polling station
at what time then it would be possible to break the secrecy
of the voter. The approach we proposed is to enable the
voter to print more than one ballot with different votes on
it. The device does not know which one the voter cast and
can therefore not break the secrecy of the vote. For future
work, we recommend to integrate mechanisms which further
improve the situation, because we cannot assume everyone
will print several votes and because this would actually take
too much time if everyone prints a bunch of test ballots.
Both approaches are receipt-free. First of all they do not
provide any data to the voter that he can take home. Second
taking a picture from the paper ballot does not serve as
receipt as it does not prove anything. The voter might have
asked for a new ballot paper or might have printed another
one after having taken the picture. Thus the cast vote and
the one on the photo would be different.
C. Usability
We distinguish between usability issues for voters and for
poll workers.
Voters’ Usability: We define voter usability as compris-
ing of ease of use, ease of understanding and accessibility.
The criterion ease of use measures the facility with which
voters can accurately cast their vote. Ideally, the process of
casting a ballot should not take any significantly long period
of time. Regarding the criterion ease of understanding it
is necessary that a voter should fully understand how to
fill out a ballot and cast it. In this respect, voters must
understand how their vote is interpreted by the system and
know if the vote is valid or not. This includes the verification
process, which, according to [9], should be understandable
for the average voter. Concerning accessibility, a voting
system must be able to be used by all eligible voters. This
includes voters with disabilities, who may face difficulties
with conventional paper ballots.
As the interface is not yet developed and no user test has
been conducted it is hard to say something about ease of
use of our proposed approach. But the goal is to come up
with an interface that is easy to use although the voter needs
to take some steps on the screen as the whole ballot is not
displayed at once (compare to Section IV and figure 2). In
addition, we would recommend to provide a demonstration
with the same interface on the internet and maybe also on
public places to enable voters to practice casting a vote using
our VCD.
Regarding the criterion ease of understand one can say
that this does not hold for the traditional system because
only few people fully understand it and more than 3.1%
usually cast an invalid one4. As our approach provides
feedback regarding the interpretation of selected candidates
and parties and informs about invalid votes, the probability is
very high that it is easier to understand even without having
justified this by a user study.
In the traditional system blind people can only cast a vote
in this type of election with assistance. The advantage of
4This is more than twice as much as for the German federal elections in
2005 and 2009.
having the VCD is that it could also provide audio output
via earphones which would allow blind or visually impaired
people to cast their vote independently and in private. Note,
if it is possible to scan ballots also in the polling station
and the scanner is equipped with an audio output the blind
voters can also verify his vote without assistance. Another
possibility it that the voter has a smart phone to take a picture
of the barcode and an application that interprets the barcode
and reads it to the voter.
Poll Workers’ Usability: The tallying process should
be easy to use and easy to understand. The later is closely
related to accuracy as it ensures that the tallying is organized
in way that it is not error prone but the votes are properly
entered into the counting and tallying software. If a system
is usable and easy to understand then the poll workers can
proceed the counting efficiently.
Our approach performs regarding both categories - accu-
racy and efficiency - better than the traditional one. Obvi-
ously, the comparison of scanned summaries displayed on
the monitor with the summaries on paper can be performed
much faster than entering candidate by candidate for each
huge ballot.
The usability statements are planned to be justified by
user studies where both approaches are compared as soon
as the interfaces are ready.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The main contribution of this paper is the proposal of a
new voting system to overcome the challenges that elections
with complicated ballots, like for local elections in Hesse,
have to deal with. Our approach is based on a vote casting
device instead of a DRE which is only used to support
voters in selecting candidates and to print a summary of
the vote, while it does not store any information. The
printed paper contains the human readable summary and
the same information coded in a barcode. This barcode is
used to improve the counting process at the end of the
Election Day. It only needs to be scanned, compared with
the printout, and accepted. Furthermore, we proposed to
use two monitors during the counting process to show both
the scanned summary and the intermediate results which is
updated after each accepted vote.
The analysis shows that our approach performs in almost
all categories better than the traditional system. Secrecy
is the only one where the system needs to be improved.
Furthermore, the voting system itself might be strengthened
by informing the voter when spoiling a vote, as more people
might make use of all options to cast a vote and not just
select one party to be sure not to spoil their vote. However,
there is a lot of future work to research on before using this
system in practice, including at least the following issues:
• implementing the corresponding interfaces after the
current usability tests;
• conducting user studies of both the vote casting inter-
face as well as the tallying software interfaces;
• conducting a field test using all three techniques (to jus-
tify the extra costs for the barcode scanner) to be able
to compare the three systems with concrete numbers
about error rates, time to cast a vote, and the tallying
phase. Therefore, we hope to closely cooperate with
the election authorities to get real data like percentage
of invalid votes and percentage of people just selecting
one candidate;
• improving the secrecy property; including avoiding side
channels by any type of emissions from the vote casting
device, the printer, or the audio channel for blind
people;
• defining the processes in particular for enabling and
disabling the vote casting device;
• providing adequate user guidelines for voters and poll
workers;
• discussing the proposal with legal experts, in particular
– whether the system meets the public nature and
verifiability requirements demanded in the court
decision [9],
– whether using the particular summary is accept-
able,
– whether one should provide a scanner in the
polling station for voters to verify that the barcode
is properly build,
– whether the assignment of unique numbers during
the counting process (as it is done currently) is
necessary and if yes integrate in the counting
process,
– which measure to further increase the level of the
secrecy of the vote is acceptable,
– how to handle VV-SV-PATs on which the voter put
manually additional signs or drawings;
• integrating audio to enable voters with disabilities to
cast their vote without assistance;
• finally one could try to even provide more verifiability
by providing some data that voters can take home and
remotely verify after the election whether their vote has
properly been entered and tallied.
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